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ABSTRACT: This article explores the ways in which key components of infrastructure built on the Yarmouk tributary 
to the Jordan River induce or impede the transformation of existing transboundary water arrangements. Focussing 
on the Jordanian-Israeli Adassiyeh Weir and on the Jordanian-Syrian Wehdeh Dam, the article interprets archival 
documents, official river-gauging data, and interviews through a frame that highlights depoliticisation by 
hydrocracies within the politics of international infrastructure. The weir is found to be operated in a manner that 
prioritises Jordanʼs commitment to Israel when flows are low, and to be designed to bound the volume that Jordan 
can make use of during low or very high flows. The dam appears oversized but regulates the flow to the downstream 
weir when its reservoir does not lie empty. The design and operation of the infrastructure is found to partially and 
selectively depoliticise contentious transboundary water issues in a manner that privileges the more powerful 
actors. Transformation of the arrangements is impeded as the distribution and use of the flows is not questioned 
by the water authorities or the international diplomatic community, and alternative arrangements are not 
considered. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the engineer of the 20th century erects his power plant on the very spot that 
previously supported a textile mill, he actualizes new forces in the old setting. 
Nature acquires a new function; and gradually it also assumes a new appearance 
(Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism, 1957). 
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What we call Manʼs power over Nature turns out to be a power exercised by some 
men over other men, with Nature as its instrument (C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of 
Man, 1943). 
No less than 20 papers in 4 special issues1 of Water Alternatives have positioned themselves in relation 
to the very different perspectives offered by the two famous authors that are quoted above. The first 
view is utilitarian and positivist, with an apparent lack of awareness of any negative consequences on 
society that human conquest of the environment may bring about. The second view is critically realist 
and, by foregrounding the politics, is focussed on what the first ignores. 
This article weighs in on the debate from the perspective of international infrastructure built on 
transboundary watercourses. More specifically, it explores the way in which the main elements of water 
infrastructure built on the Yarmouk tributary of the Jordan River induce or impede the transformation of 
the existing transboundary water arrangements. It does this by investigating how the politics of 
international infrastructure plays out between Jordan and Syria, and between Jordan and Israel. The 
international infrastructure scrutinised is the Adassiyeh Weir, which was completed five years after being 
called for in the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty, and the Wehdeh Dam, which was completed 19 years 
after being called for in the 1987 Syria-Jordan water agreement. 
This article complements the investigation started in Zeitoun et al. (2019a), which focussed on the 
influence of the international agreements that the states have signed. That article argues that the water 
agreements lock in and perpetuate inequitable arrangements by being 'blind' to the asymmetry of 
existing water use between the states, and lacking clauses that would govern groundwater use or would 
build in the flexibility required to manage the many issues currently faced by transboundary water 
resource managers. This article supplements that analysis by applying a frame of the politics of 
international infrastructure to explore the extent to which, and the way in which, the projects of hydraulic 
bureaucracies address the contentious issues and consider alternatives. 
The data comes from the published literature, archives (French, British, Zionist), interviews with 
Jordanian water resource managers, field observation, satellite imagery, and Jordanian river- and canal-
gauging records. While gauging records are presented with some degree of accuracy, the quality of the 
data (as noted in the relevant sections) limits the findings to being indicative only. A further challenge to 
the analysis is its focus on a tributary of a wider basin. An analysis of the Yarmouk tributary in isolation 
from the rest of the Jordan River Basin would be possible if only flows and water use were being 
considered, but is not possible for a study that also investigates international institutions and politics.2 
The article first reviews the politics of international infrastructure, asserting that the technocratic 
development paradigms favoured by hydrocracies (and, to a lesser extent, by mainstream hydro-
diplomacy) can depoliticise and displace rather than resolve the related contentious issues. It then 
reviews the development of infrastructure in the Yarmouk tributary basin before taking a deeper look at 
the design and operation of the Adassiyeh Weir and the Wehdeh Dam. The Jordanian-Israeli Adassiyeh 
Weir is found to be operated in such a way as to meet Jordanʼs agreed commitments to Israel, and to be 
designed to ensure that excess flows pass it by. The weir also obligates Jordan to a variable and bounded 
share: low when the river flows are low and capped when the flows are very strong. The upstream 
Jordanian-Syrian Wehdeh Dam is found to be designed on flow rates that have long since dropped, and 
thus to be oversized. When partly full, the dam is nonetheless operated in a way that generates a more 
                                                          
1 These include: F. Molle et al. (2009). Hydraulic Bureaucracies and the Hydraulic Mission: Flows of Water, Flows of Power, Water 
Alternatives 2(3): 328-349; D. Moore et al. (2010). The World Commission on Dams +10: Revisiting the Large Dam Controversy, 
Water Alternatives 2(3): 3-13; J. Obertreis et al. (2016). Water, Infrastructure and Political Rule, Water Alternatives 9(2): 168-
181; and B. Crow-Miller et al. (2017). The (Re)turn to Infrastructure for Water Management? Water Alternatives 10(2): 195-207. 
2 The Yarmouk is in any case not considered independently of the Jordan River by water resource managers (whether Syrian, 
Jordanian or Israeli), by International Water Law (which uses the wider basin as a unit of analysis), or by Annex II of the 1994 
Jordan–Israel peace treaty which discusses both together. 
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stable flow downstream, though not to the extent that it can provide the insecurity of supply resulting 
from the very concrete constraints: commitments to provide downstream flows with no certainty of or 
control over the flows received from upstream. The article concludes that while the arrangement could 
be made much more efficient through redesign of the weir and the shifts in the operating regime of the 
dam and weir, the depoliticising technocratic approaches favoured by both the water bureaucracies and 
the international diplomatic community prevent alternatives to the status quo from being considered. 
HYDROCRACIES AND DIPLOMATS STRIPPING INTERNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF ITS POLITICS 
A transboundary water 'arrangement' comprises all the agreements, protocols, infrastructure, river basin 
commissions and other institutional structures that shape policy and use of transboundary waters 
(primarily) between states. This paperʼs primary object of study is the most material of structures of a 
transboundary water arrangement; that is, the international infrastructure. The 'transformation' of a 
transboundary water arrangement is understood to be underway when the elements that maintain it are 
altered, and this requires an alternative vision to guide the knowledge and action that are required to 
fuel the alteration (Zeitoun et al., 2016). The focus of study must thus turn to the interaction of that vision 
and the infrastructure. 
Governments have long developed elaborate systems of water infrastructure to build their states 
under very different visions of 'development', as detailed for the Euphrates River in Oriental Despotism 
(Wittfogel, 1963), in the reports of the US Tennessee Valley Authority (Creighton et al., 1998; Delli-
Priscoli, 1998a), or in accounts of the actions of the government of Sudan (Verhoeven, 2012; Mohamud 
and Verhoeven, 2016). Referred to as 'hydrocracies' (Gyawali, 2001; Molle et al., 2009), the water 
bureaucracies overwhelmingly tend to follow a technocratic (and 'positivist' or traditional engineering) 
approach to the development of water resources. In some cases, hydrocracies have acquired a life, 
purpose and logic of their own (see Menga and Swyngedouw, 2018; Pyla and Phokaides, 2018; Blake, 
2019). Occasionally at armʼs length from central government and with several successful projects under 
their belts, the hydrocracies perpetuate themselves to the point where their very existence (in service to 
the state) and the infrastructure they build becomes the reason for their existence.3 (Molle et al., 2009). 
The service that hydrocracies provide to their state will often align with the political vision and 
interests of the latter. The interests can vary from satisfaction of the water 'needs' of a state's own 
citizens (Mollinga, 2008), to control of others within a stateʼs territory (Swyngedouw, 1999; Tvedt, 2004; 
Oestigaard, 2009), to control of others in territory that they the state has taken over (Headrick, 1988; 
Phare, 2009; Selby, 2013a; Dajani and Mason, 2018). The water bureaucracies can be considered in this 
way to be implementing a stateʼs 'hydraulic mission' (Allan, 2001), with 'mission' referring to the 
zealousness that can develop in water-related state-building and nation-making processes, such that the 
process of building infrastructure predominates and the original goal is no longer questioned (Allouche, 
2019). Molle et al. (2009: 336) elaborate on the process, explaining that the power wielded by 
hydrocracies is a function of "fuelling and sustaining the cycle that goes from planning to the construction 
of infrastructure" (emphasis added). Violence and political contestation of the wielding of power may 
furthermore be hidden as a result, because after infrastructure is built it can fall out of the public limelight 
and be taken for granted by many (Dajani, 2018: 74). 
It is when national hydrocracies seek to build infrastructure along their borders that the politics of 
infrastructure confronts the politics of states (see, for example, Sneddon and Fox, 2006; Thomas, 2016), 
and the process takes on an international – and sometimes less public – dimension. Critical research 
                                                          
3 This may be the case with the American Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers (Reisner, 1986), the Dams 
Implementation Unit and the Merowe Dam in Sudan (Dirar et al., 2015; Mohamud and Verhoeven, 2016; Ali et al., 2019), or the 
Turkish General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (known as DSI) and the multi-dam GAP project in Turkey (Kramer and 
Kibaroglu, 2011; Scheumann et al., 2011; Kibaroglu, 2015). 
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warns of the stifling of public debate on related issues due in part to the 'securitisation' of the resource 
by governments that seek to move it beyond the realm of politics by framing it as a matter of national 
existence. Public debate is also not pursed when political issues are treated as being nonpolitical or 
'technical', which is referred to here as 'depoliticisation' (Fox and Sneddon, 2007; Allouche et al., 2014; 
Weinthal et al., 2015). Attention is drawn, for example, to the prevailing technocratic approach of 
international diplomacy and peacebuilding efforts, whether or not they are related to water and 
environment (see, for example, Pugh, 2005). The technocratic (or 'liberal') peacebuilding approach aligns 
epistemologically with the water supply infrastructure drive preferred by the hydrocracies, making it 
more likely to be taken up by policy makers. 
Such depoliticisation can serve to build trust between key players in the hydrocracies on different 
sides of the border (for Jordan River examples, see Abitbol, 2013; Aggestam and Sundell-Eklund, 2013), 
if not with all the communities affected by the decisions. However, stripping profoundly political issues 
of their politics incurs risks, not the least of which is stifling rather than addressing the interstate tensions 
that international infrastructure can generate. Furthermore, because the technocratic approach 
understates asymmetries in power, it may not consider all the aspects of the issue in question that are 
relevant to its resolution, for example its rights-based aspects or the ethics of sustainable development 
(Selby, 2013b; Aggestam and Sundell, 2015). Not only is the size of the 'basket of policy options' reduced 
as a result, but the policy that is implemented is likely to be that which is preferred by the more powerful 
actor (Ferguson, 1993). In extreme cases of power asymmetry, a 'culture of silence' can develop among 
the less-powerful actors (Freire, 1972: 2), and consent to the arrangement can be established – even if it 
is not openly acknowledged – whether among workers in the Appalachian Valley (Gaventa, 2005: 18) or 
among the marginalised water users along the Jordan River (Zeitoun et al., 2019). 
In this view, the boreholes, dams, and weirs that hydrocracies build under a technocratic paradigm 
can also be read as (literally) concrete manifestations of hard power plays. Once the infrastructure is in 
place, the reputation of the hydrocracy becomes tied to its success, a new pattern of use is established, 
and a new relation develops between the users and the resource. The new relationships are not typically 
challenged by technocratic diplomatic initiatives, and can be expected to fall out of the awareness of the 
general public. Related expressions of soft power include the narratives created around the watercourse, 
and setting the agenda for what is and what is not up for discussion (see, for example, Daoudy, 2009). As 
a result, the alternative vision, knowledge or action that is required for the transformation of a 
transboundary water arrangement must confront the existing set of institutions which, in some cases, 
may be very well established. 
The assertion is, then, that technocratic and depoliticising approaches to diplomacy can re-enforce 
the paradigm that drives the state hydrocracies, thereby foreclosing public debate about the 
relationships established through the international infrastructure. In turn, the infrastructure tends to 
operate out of the public limelight and towards the interests of the more powerful party. Alternatives to 
the arrangement will either challenge what has been established or will fail to develop in the first place. 
As will be discussed, it is the latter situation that appears to emerge from the design and operation of the 
Adassiyeh Weir and Wehdeh Dam. 
A CENTURY OF UNCOORDINATED INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE YARMOUK TRIBUTARY BASIN 
This section reviews the political context from which the hydrocracies and international infrastructure on 
the Yarmouk emerged. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, dozens of dams have been built along the six sub-
tributaries,4 and thousands of wells have been drilled into the basalt and limestone aquifers that underlie 
the basin. The infrastructure has been built in a wholly uncoordinated manner, which is an expected 
                                                          
4 The tributaries are (in Syria), the Raqqad, al ‘Allan, Hareer/Arram, Thahab, and (in Jordan) the Zeidi and the Shallala. 
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result when three hydrocracies are operating at different periods and speeds from within a constantly 
changing political context.5 
Figure 1. Topographic perspective (looking northeast) of the basin of the Yarmouk tributary to the Jordan 
River, indicating the Wehdeh Dam, Adassiyeh Weir, and smaller dams on the tributaries. 
 
Source: Prepared by Marin Stefani based on analysis led by Chadi Abdallah. 
Note: The map shows the location of the Adassiyeh Weir (yellow star), the Wehdeh Dam (red diamond), and 31 smaller dams. 
All political entities that have controlled the territory – whether they be Ottoman, British, French, Arab, 
Zionist, Syrian, Jordanian or Israeli – have built infrastructure to exploit the waters (see top line of Figure 
3). Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, the mainstream of the 
Yarmouk tributary served as the border between French Syria, British Transjordan, and (for about eight 
miles back from the confluence of the Yarmouk tributary with the Jordan River) British Mandate 
Palestine. By 1948, following Syrian and Jordanian independence from France and Britain, and the 
Palestinian Nakba, the Yarmouk marked the border of Syria, Jordan, and (for about eight miles) Israel. 
Israelʼs occupation of the Golan in 1967 expanded its direct territorial control a further two miles up the 
river (Daoudy, 2008), to the confluence of the Raqqad tributary with the Yarmouk mainstream – the site 
of the Ibn al Khaldunʼs 'Battle of the Yarmouk' over 1300 years earlier and near todayʼs Israeli colony of 
Kibbutz Meitsar. 
                                                          
5 In the sense that the hydrocracies do not coordinate their claims on the river, Smith’s biblical observation of cooperation on 
the river made in 1966 still holds: "[T]he rival Jordan diversion schemes now being carried out by Israel and the Arab states can 
be likened to a limb from limb rending of the infant by irreconcilable and importunate parents" (Smith, 1966: 111) (emphasis 
added). 
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Figure 2. Sketch of infrastructure in Yarmouk tributary basin, showing location of the Wehdeh Dam, the 
Adassiyeh Weir, and the King Abdullah Canal (not to scale). 
 
Source: authors. 
Technocratic development of the Yarmouk and Jordan 
Throughout the basin, plans for water infrastructure have been more prevalent than the infrastructure 
itself. One of first major plans to develop the Yarmouk flows is found in the 1913 Ottoman 'Franjieh' 
concession, which proposed the transfer of 100 million cubic metres per year (Mm3/y) of the Yarmouk 
flow to the Lake of Tiberias in order to generate electricity and irrigate the Jordan Valley (Haddadin, 
2002). The Ottoman authorities also conceded the use of parts of the Jordan and Yarmouk to Greek 
citizen Euripides Mavrommatis in 1914 for hydroelectric and other purposes (CO, 1926, 1927). The plans 
were revived in 1926 when the British granted a concession to Russian businessman and Zionist leader 
Pinhas Rutenberg to use the Yarmouk and Jordan flows to operate a power plant at their confluence – 
the then Jordanian territory of Baqura (referred to as Naharayim, or 'two rivers', in Israel).6 
                                                          
6 Farming by Israelis in the Jordanian territory of Baqura continues until the time of writing, having been assured until October 
2019 under the terms of Annex I of the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty (the specified period of 25 years). In October 2018, the 
Jordanian side indicated its desire to enter into consultations with Israel about the terms of this arrangement.  
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Figure 3. Infrastructure, interests and agreements in the Yarmouk tributary to the Jordan Basin, in relation to the volatile political context. Note the 
context within which the Yarmouk agreements develop, and the building of the Adassiyeh Weir and Wehdeh Dam occur. 
 
Notes: FMS = French Mandate Syria; TJ = Transjordan; Z = pre-1948 Zionist; S = Syria; J = Jordan; Is = Israel. 
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Figure 4. Left: The inauguration of the Palestine Electric Corporationʼs Naharayim power plant in 1933 by 
Emir Abdullah of Jordan. Its owner, Pinhas Rutenberg, looks on. Right: aerial photograph of the 
Naharayim power plant.  
  
Source: Avitzur, 2003. 
The plant was completed in 1930, and was the first major piece of infrastructure on the river. As seen in 
Figure 4, it was formally inaugurated in 1933 by Emir Abdullah, then ruler of Transjordan (Avitzur, 2003). 
The plant was initially seen as crucial to expanding the 'carrying capacity' of the land of Palestine, which 
was the argument made by Zionists to the British authorities in response to a policy to limit Jewish 
immigration to Palestine7 (Reguer, 1995: 704). The plant was productive until 1948, at which point the 
Iraqi armed forces took control of it in the course of the fighting that led to the Palestinian Nakba and 
the creation of the State of Israel. 
While water development plans stalled during the 1940s, Jordan, Israel and Syria planned their 
individual hydraulic missions, each of which had their international diplomatic backers. The British-led 
'TVA on the Jordan' plan (a.k.a. 'Hays Plan' or 'Hays-Lowdermilk Plan)8 sought to emulate the American 
colonising development plan (Alatout, 2009). It proposed diverting the mainstream of the Jordan River 
and half of the Yarmouk tributary to the Lake of Tiberias for use in British Mandate Palestine, with the 
other half of the Yarmouk flows to be for use by Jordan (Hays, 1948). Very critical of the predicted effects 
that the 'TVA on the Jordan' plan would have on Jordan, British engineer R.H. MacDonald developed, in 
response, the 1951 'MacDonald Plan' (FO, 1949). This plan proposed the Lake of Tiberias as a storage 
reservoir to feed irrigation canals on the ghors (flood plains) of the Jordan River (MacDonald & Partners, 
1951), the eastern one of which would be built by Jordan as the 'East Ghor Canal' in 1959. The East Ghor 
Canal, later renamed the King Abdullah Canal (KAC), is the oldest Yarmouk infrastructure still in operation 
and is a vital conveyor of water to the farms of the Jordan River Valley (and, later, supplied drinking water 
for cities) (Venot et al., 2007). 
                                                          
7 By the time the plant was occupied by Iraqi forces in 1948, its importance had dropped relative to other sources of electricity, 
supplying just a quarter of the British Mandate’s electricity demand (Avitzur, 2003). 
8 Hays was the American project manager of the original TVA; in 1944, he was requested by the British Commission on Palestine 
to review the water plans for Palestine. The report he published in 1948 – called 'TVA on the Jordan' – hosts an introduction 
from American engineer Walter C. Lowdermilk. Lowdermilk, in this introduction, invokes the mindset of man’s dominion over 
nature when he writes that “there are few places in the world where mankind has a more favourable opportunity to adopt a 
constructive approach towards the problems of the common man”, citing the plan’s potential for providing “an example of the 
backward Middle East” (Hays, 1948). Following the 1948 Nakba, the plan was never implemented for Palestine, but was later 
developed by Israel as the Lowdermilk-Hays Plan.  
Water Alternatives – 2019  Volume 12 | Issue 3 
Zeitoun et al.: The Yarmouk River infrastructures  Page | 1103 
The most concerted Jordan River Basin-wide diplomatic effort during this period was the US-led 
'Johnston Mission', which resulted in the 'Johnston Plan' that allocated the flows among the four riparian 
states of the time. The 1952 'Bunger Plan' may have been the first to propose a dam at Maqarin. As seen 
in Figure 1, Maqarin is the remarkable confluence point of five out of six of the Yarmoukʼs main tributaries 
(Sevette, 1953). The idea was re-proposed in the 1953 'Main Plan' (Main, 1953), and written into both 
the 1953 and the 1987 Syria-Jordan water agreements (as discussed at length in the companion 'Yarmouk' 
article). The Bunger Plan also proposed a diversion weir at Adassiyeh, downstream of Maqarin and thus 
able to also capture the flows of the fifth tributary, the Raqqad; it also proposed a smaller dam at al 
Himmeh/Hamat Gader just upstream of it, which was to regulate flows into the weir and operate in 
concert with releases from the Maqarin Dam. As will be discussed later, only the former was built. 
Soon afterwards, during a period of high visibility and very public hydropolitics, contestation over the 
infrastructure took much more overt forms. The fledgling Israeli water bureaucracy attempted to 
implement the 'TVA on the Jordan' plan in 1953, though the effort was bombed by the Syrian army. In 
1962, due to Israeli lobbying of British authorities, the plans of the (Jordanian) Jordan Valley Authority to 
build the Khalid Dam near Maqarin were thwarted, which went against the expressed will of the US 
diplomats (Baker-Harza, 1953; FO, 1962: EJ 1422/5,9). In 1964, Israeli forces bombed the projects of the 
Syrian-Egyptian Arab plan that were intended to divert the headwaters of the Jordan. In 1966 and 1967, 
the Israeli army bombed the JVA construction sites of the Khalid Ibn al Waleed Dam at Mukheibeh 
(Suleiman, 2003; Ibrahim, 2013), and bombed its East Ghor Canal on eight occasions between 1969 and 
1970 (Sosland, 2007). 
Israel eventually implemented elements of the 'TVA on the Jordan' plan in 1964, notably the National 
Water Carrier that drew water from the Lake of Tiberias, in a step considered crucial to the "political 
construction of the nation-state" of Israel and to the establishment of Mekoroth (Alatout, 2009: 379). 
The bureaucracies of each of the Yarmouk states meanwhile embarked on separate hydraulic missions 
by drilling hundreds of wells to abstract the groundwater and dozens of dams to utilise almost every 
source of surface water, including in the Hauran Plain by the Syrian Ministry of Water Resources (Etana, 
2015; Cafiero, 2016; Dana, 2016). In contrast, the artesian wells that bubbled up to the surface near the 
Yarmouk mainstream at Mukheibeh were developed during this period by local Jordanian farmers, and 
thousands more wells were drilled without licenses by individuals on the Syrian and Jordanian parts of 
the Hauran Plain. However, the plan to use the Lake of Tiberias to store the winter flood flows of the 
Yarmouk was not to materialise until the Jordan-Israel peace treaty was agreed to in 1994. 
Current and future use of water 
More current estimates of the use of Yarmouk flows differ considerably from the Johnston Plan 
allocations, and come from numerous secondary sources processed in UEA (2019). Those documents 
assess that water users in Syria withdraw approximately 335 Mm3/y from the Yarmouk tributary basin, 
of which approximately 170 Mm3/y is groundwater pumped from thousands of licensed and unlicensed 
wells, and roughly 165 Mm3/y9 is surface water stored behind 32 dams. Estimates by Jordanian JVA and 
the Ministry of Water and Irrigation are: approximately 98 Mm3/y drawn directly from the Yarmouk – 
about 32 Mm3/y of which is groundwater pumped from over 200 wells – and the flows that are diverted 
into the King Abdullah Canal (as will be discussed). The (Israeli) Jordan Valley Water Authority (a local 
institution that is distinct from the much larger national water provider, Mekoroth) is estimated to use 
approximately 56 Mm3/y of Yarmouk flows, counting the 35 Mm3/y used directly from the Yarmouk 
                                                          
9 Ministry of Water and Irrigation (2014), cited in UN-ESCWA/BGR (2013: 197), states that Syrian use of water in the Yarmouk 
tributary basin is 453 Mm3/y, but this figure applies to the administrative boundary of the Yarmouk (i.e. including all of Al-
Suwayda Governorate). Of this, 327 Mm3/y (60% of which is groundwater) is used for agriculture, 92 Mm3/y is for domestic use 
(assumed to be all from groundwater), and 34 Mm3/y is for industry (assumed to be all from surface water). The figure 165 
Mm3/y is derived from these figures and is accurate within the margins of error deriving from the above assumptions. The figure 
also matches closely with the 180 Mm3/y given in Al Qusaym (2016) and Hoff (n.d.).  
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tributary via the Yarmoukim Reservoir (as will be discussed), a roughly estimated 4 or 5 Mm3/y from the 
four dams (with 10 Mm3/y retention capacity) in the Occupied Syrian Golan Heights, about 2 Mm3/y from 
the wells on the Golan at Meitsar (HSI, 2016a: 352), and 14 Mm3/y of spring discharge at al 
Himmeh/Hamat Gader (HSI, 2016a: 353). 
With water resources in the Jordan River Basin more or less fully exploited, no state is particularly well 
equipped for further expected changes in water availability. The flow into the Yarmouk mainstream is 
expected to drop further when Syrian farmers return to their livelihoods on the Hauran Plain (Muller et 
al., 2016) or when climate change causes a drop in precipitation rates (Al Raggad et al., 2018; Shentsis et 
al., 2018) or river flows (Rajsekhar and Gorelick, 2017). The hydraulic mission of each state has since 
evolved away from dams and boreholes. Most of the infrastructure built since the 1970s is related to 
what are considered more efficient irrigation systems (Margane et al., 1996; Al-Husein, 2007), and – in 
Israel – wastewater reuse (Feitelson, 2004) and desalination (Aviram et al., 2014). Some of the very last 
of the 'classic' types of infrastructure built in the Jordan River Basin were completed on the Yarmouk 
tributary: the Adassiyeh Weir in 1999, and the Wehdeh Dam in 2006. 
THE JORDANIAN-ISRAELI ADASSIYEH WEIR 
From sand and rocks to concrete 
From a hydraulic perspective, the optimum spot to divert Yarmouk flows to irrigate the eastern flood 
plain of the Jordan River Valley is at Adassiyeh, because of its relatively high elevation at a point near the 
valley. As the 1952 Bunger Plan noted, a diversion weir built at Adassiyeh would benefit from a small 
flow-regulating dam (with a proposed storage capacity of about 8 Mm3) built at the relatively flat area at 
al Himmeh just upstream (FCO, 1979). The sovereignty of al Himmeh was contested between Syria and 
British Mandate Palestine, however, and the territory was occupied and renamed Hamet Gader by Israel 
in 1967 (Neff, 1994; Al Majdoub, 1998; Ishtayyeh, 2011; see also UEA, 2019: Box 2). 
The Jordanian water bureaucracy had been benefitting from the supply of some Yarmouk flows to the 
East Ghor Canal through a sandbar at Adassiyeh that diverted the flows southwards, and which was 
created as sediment was deposited in the river bed (Haddadin, 2002: 221). Against the expressed will of 
the Jordanian government, Israeli farmers of the 'Yarmouk triangle'10 extended a rudimentary rock weir 
(Figure 5) across the entire river in 1976, in order to ensure a stable flow for their use downstream 
(Haddadin, 2006; Kinnarty, in Sosland, 2007). Jordanian attempts to build a more solid weir were 
thwarted by the Israeli governmentʼs lobbying of British authorities; Israel put forward its concern that 
the flows be reserved for use by Palestinians in further downstream on the West Bank of the Jordan River 
(Sosland, 2007: 104, 112). The concern was also to extend to Israeli Yarmouk triangle famers, who had 
been lobbying to secure a flow of 40 Mm3/y since 1948 (Haddadin, 2000).11 
Following the well-documented US-facilitated Jordanian-Israeli 'picnic table' talks held at Baqura (see 
Haddadin, 2002; Shamir, 2003), the decision to build the concrete Adassiyeh Weir that stands today was 
specified in the 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty. Annex II, Article II, Paragraph I of the treaty states that: 
                                                          
10 This is the land between the southern end of the Lake of Tiberias, the foot of the Golan Heights, and the confluence of the 
Yarmouk and Jordan (Baqura/Naharayim). 
11 During the 1950 Johnston negotiations, Israeli officials had advocated for an assured 25 Mm3/y of the flow, and this was 
secured in the Johnston Plan (Phillips et al., 2007). Interestingly, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Israel and 
the US Government stated that Israel’s share is 40 Mm3/y, while the MoU with the Arab countries stated that it was 25 Mm3/y. 
The issue was raised again in 1976 by then Deputy Water Commissioner Shaul Arlosoroff (US NESAA, 1976), and in 1978 by the 
acting US Deputy Chief of Mission Samuel Hart in a letter to Israeli Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Moshe Alon (Hart, 1978). 
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Figure 5. The rock weir built by Israeli farmers in 1962, to allow more flow downstream to the Yarmouk 
triangle. 
 
Source: ISA (1939). 
Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a diversion/storage dam on the Yarmouk River directly downstream 
of the point 121/Adassiyeh Diversion. The purpose is to improve the diversion efficiency into the King 
Abdullah Canal of the water allocation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and possibly for the diversion of 
Israelʼs allocation of the river water (emphasis added). 
In refusing to build on the territory of al Himmeh that Israel contests with Syria (Haddadin, 2002), Jordan 
effectively consented to the construction of the concrete weir without the related storage dam upstream. 
The concrete weir was also designed as a crucial component of the Yarmouk-Tiberias 'water exchange' 
arrangement between Jordan and Israel, which is reviewed critically in Zeitoun et al. (2019a). In effect, 
then, the completion of the Adassiyeh Diversion Weir in 1999 was one of the final steps taken towards 
implementation of the 'TVA on the Jordan' plan to store Yarmouk flood flows in the Lake of Tiberias that 
was once so contested, and signalled the end of the Bunger or other plans initiated by Jordan. 
Planning, construction, design and operation of the Adassiyeh Weir 
The successful construction of the weir also indicated that Jordan and Israel managed to skirt the 
disagreements over both the sovereignty of al Himmeh and the distribution of Yarmouk flows, and has 
apparently resulted in a period of low contestation between the two hydrocracies – for which US 
diplomacy can take some credit. The extent to which it has improved the "diversion efficiency into the 
King Abdullah Canal" warrants further investigation, however. 
As shown in Table A.1 in the annex, the (Jordanian) Jordan Valley Authority has been gauging the river 
flow at Adassiyeh since 1962, though distributing and accounting for the flows in different ways as the 
Adassiyeh Weir and Wehdeh Dam have been brought online. Column b of Table A.1 suggests a steadily 
declining trend in the volumes being diverted into the King Abdullah Canal by the sandbar or rock weir, 
possibly related to the decline in river flow due to climatic factors and increased abstractions upstream 
(Haddadin, 2002: 261; HSI, 2016b; Muller et al., 2016). There also appears to be a marked drop in the 
flows from 1999 onwards – the year that the Adassiyeh Weir was completed. The drop cannot be wholly 
attributed to the weir, however, because of the manner by which the Jordan Valley Authority recorded 
data from 1999 onwards. According to JVA staff members responsible for collection and recording of the 
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data, and as shown in Column (e), the JVA-recorded flow gauged as entering into the KAC at Adassiyeh 
from 1995 onwards included all of the flows diverted by the weir as well as the flows from the previously 
mentioned Mukheibeh wells, which had been diverted away from the farmers of the area by the 
Jordanian authorities and canalised into the river as agreed in the 1994 Water Annex (Ghureir, 2018; 
Shattat, 2018, UEA, 2019). From 2006, the flows gauged by the JVA as entering the KAC at Adassiyeh (still 
Column e) further include the flows released from the Wehdeh Dam, which was completed the same year 
(as discussed further in the next section). The 'total flows' going into the KAC from 2006 onwards are thus 
gauged from three separate sources (i.e. river flow (gauged downstream of the Wehdeh Dam but 
upstream of the Mukheibeh wells (thus capturing the flow of Raqqad tributary), the Mukheibeh wells 
themselves, and releases from Wehdeh releases) (Ghureir, 2018; Shattat, 2018), even if they flow 
physically together by the time they reach Adassiyeh. 
Even with this understanding of the way the flows have been gauged and are accounted for, there 
remains an apparent marked decline in the flows diverted into the KAC. As shown in Figure 6, the drop in 
flows into the KAC before and after the construction of the Adassiyeh Weir affects the flows diverted 
into, or bypassing, the weir to different degrees. The figure shows that the KAC had on average 72 Mm3/y 
diverted into it in the 19 years since the weir was built, with exceptionally heavy (flood) flow years 
excluded (Table A.1, Column e). This is about 47 Mm3/y less than the 118 Mm3/y diverted into it from 
1986 to 1999 (1986 being the first year for which data on the bypass flows is available, and the 
exceptionally heavy (flood) flow years of 1999 and 2003 excluded). 
Figure 6. Flows diverted to, bypassing or overspilling the KAC, from 1986 to 2018. 
 
Notes: The average flow is interpreted for the years on either side of the year of completion of the Adassiyeh Diversion Weir 
(1999), within data limitations discussed in the text; heavy flood years are excluded. When flood years are included, the average 
flows bypassing the KAC are 125 Mm3/y (before 1999) and 69 Mm3/y (after 1999). Data from JVA (2016a) has been checked 
against JVA (2006) and JVA (2018), with minor irregularities due to different labels and periods, and as detailed in Table A.1. 
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The rough average of 87 Mm3/y that overspilled the KAC from 1986 to 1999 dropped to an amount of 48 
Mm3/y bypassing or overspilling the weir from 1999 to 2018 (Table A.1, Column f). Put another way, flows 
diverted into the KAC dropped by about 47 Mm3 per year on average after the weir was built, while the 
flows that bypassed the KAC dropped by 39 Mm3 per year/ A visual assessment of the flows bypassing 
the weir (the red dots of Figure 6) suggests that the flows bypassing the weir are generally much more 
regular than the flows that get diverted (the blue triangles), especially if other high-flow years are not 
included. 
While the flow gauged at Adassiyeh reflects the flow of the river, the flow into the KAC at the same 
point is also determined by the design and operation of the weir. As shown in Figure 7, the concrete weir 
spans the width of the Yarmouk mainstream, arresting the flow so that it is diverted southwards into the 
KAC channel. The JVA gauging records refer to the flows entering the canal at this point as 'Alpha' flows 
(Column € of Table A.1). The flows that the weir operators allow to bypass the weir do so through two 
gates that can be opened to allow transmission via a gauged pipe back to the riverbed several dozen 
metres downstream. These flows are referred to by the JVA as 'beta' flows (and found in Column f). 
During heavy floods (for example, in 1992 and 2003), the mainstream flows spill over the crest of the weir 
and continue into the river channel; they are referred to by the JVA as 'uncontrolled water' (Column g), 
and are subsumed in the JVA records as 'beta' flows (Column f). 
Figure 7. The Jordanian-Israeli Adassiyeh Diversion Weir from several perspectives. 
(a) Sketch adapted from Haddadin (2002: 289), indicating 'alpha' or 'beta' flows 
 
(b) The Adassiyeh Diversion Weir looking northeast. 
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(c) The Adassiyeh Diversion Weir looking north.   (d) Looking west: gates 
  
Source: a) Sketch adapted from Haddadin (2002: 289); b) Photo taken in situ on February 2002, source unknown; c) Photo taken 
by the authors, in situ on September 2018; d) Photo taken by the authors, in situ on September 2018. 
Notes: (a) Sketch indicating flows JVA records as 'alpha' (diverted to KAC) or 'beta' (bypassing or overspilling the crest of the 
weir); (b) Looking northeast – showing the crest of the weir spanning from Israel on the left to Jordan on the right, the channel 
towards the KAC on the right, and the flushing channel aligned with the river direction in between; (c) Looking north – flows 
diverted to the KAC through the channel, which the JVA records as a compilation of flows from the river, from Mukheibeh wells, 
and water released from the Wehdeh Dam (note remote gauge on top right); (d) Looking west – two gates, one of which is open, 
on the west side of the diversion structure (circled) through which some of the flows counted as 'beta' by the JVA bypass the 
weir, in accordance with the 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty. 
The maximum limit of flow diverted into the KAC is set by the Water Authority of Jordan at 10 to 14 m3/s 
(upper limit equivalent to about 440 Mm3/y),12 out of concern for the excess turbidity that it would have 
to remove before passing it on to consumers (Ghureir, 2018; Ghantous, 2018). The regulation is enforced 
physically by an additional set of gates roughly 50 metres downstream along the KAC (not shown in Figure 
6), though is of an order of magnitude greater than the current inflows into the KAC, and therefore not 
likely to actually limit the possibly increased diversions in any way. 
As is the case with most weirs, the actual volume of the flow diverted varies with changes in the depth 
and velocity of the streamflow, and the flows spilling over the crest can be substantial (Column g of Table 
A.1). Following the terms of the Water Annex of the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty that was agreed to 
five years before the weir was built, the Jordanian JVA operator of the weir ensures that a minimum of 
1m3/s flows through the two bypass gates used to channel the flows around the weir (Ghureir, 2018; 
Ghantous, 2018). This is equivalent to roughly 32 Mm3/y, or nearly one-quarter more than the 25 Mm3/y 
that Jordan agreed to provide to Israel in the 1994 treaty. The extra is added to make up for evaporation 
or seepage losses, in order to ensure that 25 Mm3/y is delivered at the Israeli border (Ghureir, 2018). 
When considered alongside the 'uncontrolled water' (flood flows of Column g) that overspills the weir, 
roughly 69 Mm3/y on average was not diverted into the King Abdullah Canal from 1999 to 2018 (see 
Column f and Figure 6). As scrutinised in Zeitoun et al. (2019a), all of these flows are dammed and 
diverted to the Israeli Yarmoukim Reservoir (see Figure 2). Israeli JVWA data accounts for the 35 Mm3/y 
                                                          
12 In contrast, the 1979 Harza Jordan River Stage II project had suggested controlled releases and a maximum diversion of 20 
m3/s (630 Mm3/y) (Harza, 1979: 11; Haddadin, 2017). 
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used by Israeli farmers and kibbutzim in the Yarmouk triangle – which is close to the previously mentioned 
amount (40 Mm3/y) that had been lobbied for by the farmers in the 1970s.13 
Taken together, the Adassiyeh Weir and the water exchange infrastructure provide a reliable flow to 
Israel and an intermittent flow to Jordan. In dry years (where the flow at Adassiyeh is, say, less than 100 
Mm3/y – though more thorough investigation is required to give a reliable figure), the flow to Israel and 
to Jordan are roughly equal. In exceptionally wet years (where the flow at Adassiyeh is very roughly 
greater than 200 Mm3/y (though, again, more thorough investigation is wanting), the flow to Israel may 
be greater than the flow into the KAC. During years that where the flow is considered neither very low or 
high, Israel is secured a steady share, while Jordanʼs share varies. 
Given the asymmetric distribution of control and use of Jordan River Basin water between the two 
states, the finding begs the question why modifications to the design or operation of the weir is not 
considered. Letting a greater share of the Yarmouk tributary flow by gravity into the KAC would be more 
efficient, for instance, and arguably more equitable. The role of the Wehdeh Dam upstream must be 
considered beforehand, however, before conclusions can be drawn. 
THE JORDANIAN-SYRIAN WEHDEH DAM 
The decision to build a dam near Maqarin was based on its location as the international border meeting 
point of five of the six most important tributaries to the Yarmouk (see Figures 1 and 8). The site of the 
dam was agreed upon by both Jordan and Syria in the water agreement they signed in 1953, shortly after 
Bungerʼs proposal. Two of the goals of the dam stated in the document were to produce hydroelectricity 
and to regulate the river flow for the Adassiyeh Weir downstream (and, in doing so, regulating the 
diversion to the eastern shore eastern shore of the Jordan River through the East Ghor – later King 
Abdullah – Canal). With these goals in mind, the Maqarin Dam was originally designed to be 160 metres 
high and to have a storage capacity of 500 Mm3. 
After originally ruling out the Maqarin Dam at the start of its negotiations, the Johnston Plan later 
called for an 85-metre-high dam with a capacity of 73 Mm3, with the possibility of extending the height 
to 95 metres (Johnston, 1955). Following decades of Israeli obstruction of the building of the dam 
(Sosland, 2007), in the 1970s the Jordanian hydrocracy and government engaged in assertive diplomacy, 
including it in the Jordan Valley Development Plan, 1975-1982, and in the amendment of the 1953 
Yarmouk water agreement (Haddadin, 2007: 102). 
Increased Syrian use of the tributary flows in the Hauran Plain and the increasing domestic pressure 
on the Government of Jordan to secure more water resulted in an expansion of the objectives of the dam 
to also providing municipal and industrial water for northern Jordan (Haddadin, 2002: 227). In this way, 
a dual-purpose dam at Maqarin was re-stipulated in the 1987 Jordan-Syrian water agreement, but with 
the design height reduced from the 1953 figure of 160 metres to 100 metres. The opportunity to build 
the dam finally came about after Israeli concerns were offset by the 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty, and 
during a period of good relations between Jordan and Syria, in 2006. 
                                                          
13 The JVWA data and the companion paper also detail how Israel pumps back an average of 47 Mm3/y from the Lake of Tiberias 
to the King Abdullah Canal (which is more than double the amount it committed to under the Water Annex). 
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Figure 8. The Jordanian-Syrian Wehdeh Dam, September 2018, looking north, with Syria in the 
background and Jordan in the foreground. 
 
Source: Authors (2018). 
Design and operation of the Wehdeh Dam 
As the Jordanian-sponsored report referred to as the Orient Study indicates, the design parameters for 
the dam were based on river flows and water use from the 1970s (Orient, 2011). Yet, by the time the 
dam was constructed in 2006, i) the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Water Annex had been signed; ii) the 
Adassiyeh Weir had been constructed; iii) Jordan had hosted its second and third large wave of people 
fleeing war (from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the US/UK invasion of Iraq in 2003); iv) the Syrian (and 
to a much lesser degree Jordanian) governments and farmers had drilled thousands of wells within the 
basin; and v) the long-term average flow at Maqarin (the site of the dam) was much lower than it had 
been in the 1950s, possibly due to the ever-expanding Syrian and Jordanian hydraulic missions. 
As shown in Figures 9 and 10, one result of using outdated design parameters was that the dam lay empty 
for several years after its completion. This sparked new tensions over use of the Yarmouk, with formal 
and informal Jordanian voices blaming exploitation by Syria for the lack of water, and members of the 
Jordanian hydrocracy loudly proclaiming 'violations' of the 1987 Jordan-Syria water agreement14 
(Hussein, 2017). Figure 9 shows that the inflow into the reservoir began increasing from 2011 onwards, 
with an inflow of about 70 Mm3 in 2012 and 124 Mm3 in 2016. The increase has been attributed to the 
hundreds of thousands of people displaced by the conflict in Syria, which has allegedly resulted in a 
reduction of groundwater pumping for irrigation, particularly in the Syrian part of the Hauran Plain 
(Muller et al., 2016; Avisse et al., 2017). The increased inflow has also been attributed to the absence of 
coordinated dam management in Syria, and possibly has also been caused by altered rainfall and recharge 
patterns (UEA, 2019). 
                                                          
14 The analysis of the companion Yarmouk article reveals that the accusations are not founded, pointing out that deficiencies in 
the water agreement are blocking progress towards a more equitable and sustainable transboundary water arrangement.  
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Figure 9. Flows in and out of the Wehdeh Dam reservoir (not storage), 2008-2018. 
 
Sources: For 2007 to 2015, the data comes from a second JVA dataset referred to as JVA (2016b), which records daily flows into, 
and releases from, the Wehdeh Dam. It does not exactly match the release data of JVA (2016a), and so also does not match the 
data of Table A.1, Column d. Data for the years 2016 to 2018 (inclusive) comes from updated dataset JVA (2019). 
Notes: The outflow of the Wehdeh Dam for 2007 to 2011 (< 20 Mm3/y) appears low, in relation to the longer-term (1999 to 
2018) and previously-discussed average flows diverted into the KAC (69 Mm3/y) or bypassing it (72 Mm3/y, for a total of 141 
Mm3/y). The discrepancy may be explained by considering the additional flows into the river downstream of the Wehdeh Dam: 
from the Raqqad tributary (no data from the Syrian gauging station is available, but the JVA gauge (data shown in Table A.2 
column b) is just further downstream so can act as reasonable proxy) and from the Mukheibeh wells (Table A.1, Column c).  
According to the JVA, the average and highly variable flow of the river upstream of Mukheibeh Wells from 1999 to 2008 (year 
Wehdeh Dam was built) is 38 Mm3/y. The average gauged flow of the Mukheibeh Wells for 2008 (first year of gauging) to 2018 
is a much more steady 36 Mm3/y. To the extent that the comparison is valid, the total flow of the river and the Mukheibeh (not 
including releases from the dam) is an indicative 74 Mm3/y (and this is comparable to the 77 Mm3/y from 1990 to 2010 (dates 
for which data is available) gauged by the Hydrological Survey of Israel data at Adassiyeh ('Gate 121' gauging station), further 
downstream (HSI , 2016b)). The rest of the discrepancy may be attributed to the great influence of flood flows and the many 
issues with reliability of the data (uncalibrated datasets, measurement and reporting errors, etc.). Reminder: the numerical 
findings of this analysis should be considered 'indicative'. 
Figure 10. Volume retained by the Wehdeh Dam during the spring season. Note that this is different from 
the gauged inflow into the dam presented in Figure 8, as it is based on a different method. 
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Based on analysis of satellite imagery from UEA (2019) (and roughly concurrent with the satellite imagery 
analysis undertaken through a different method, in Avisse et al., 2017), Figure 10 shows that the volume 
of water retained behind the Wehdeh Dam increased from about 32 Mm3 in 2012 to 58 Mm3 in 2013, 
and reached a maximum of 75 Mm3 in 2015. 
The damʼs objective of regulating the supply to the Adassiyeh Weir (and thus to the KAC) became doubly 
important once construction of the smaller regulating dam for the Adassiyeh Weir, at al Himmeh, was no 
longer a viable option because (as discussed) of contested sovereignty. The data that informs Figure 9 
shows that the Wehdeh Dam performs this function, in the sense that more water is released during the 
dry (summer) months and retained during the wet (winter) months. But the volatility of the inflows 
(Figure 9) and storage (Figure 10) suggest that a more thorough assessment is warranted. 
Figure 11 considers the Wehdeh Dam and Adassiyeh Weir in concert, by comparing the inflows and 
releases from the dam with the flows diverted into, or bypassing, the King Abdullah Canal. Within the 
noted limitations in data, Figure 11 reveals several significant features. The first is the general 
synchronicity between the amount of water released from the Wehdeh Dam and the flows that enter or 
bypass the KAC. In other words, as more water enters the Wehdeh Dam, more water is released and 
more water both enters and bypasses the KAC. Considering the inconsistent amount of water entering 
the dam, the figures suggest that the dam is fulfilling its river-regulation role (as previously noted). A 
second point is that there is a rapid 'response' between dam releases and flows entering or bypassing the 
KAC. This would suggest that the original plan to have a second, smaller dam just for regulating flows for 
the Adassiyeh Weir remains a good idea from a hydraulic perspective. Third, noting the increased flow 
into the KAC, Jordan appears to be benefitting to a certain degree from the infrastructure whose 
construction it has negotiated upstream (the dam) and downstream (the weir) on the Yarmouk, even if 
it was built out of sequence. The assessment must be put in the context of the findings of Figure 5, 
however, which show that Jordan has been able to use less water from the Yarmouk since the year the 
Adassiyeh Weir was built. 
Figure 11. Indicative comparison of Yarmouk inflows into, and releases from, the Wehdeh Dam. 
 
Notes: Solid lines are from JVA, 2016a; dashed lines (the flows diverted by, or bypassing, the Adassiyeh Weir) are from JVA, 
2016b and JVA, 2019. The two datasets from which the data are taken have not been calibrated, meaning the findings are 
indicative only; this explains discrepancies with the data of Table A.1. 
WD = Wehdeh Dam; KAC = King Abdullah Canal. 
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A related point is that the flows bypassing the weir and KAC remain consistently above 30 Mm3/y even 
when the flows to the KAC are very low. Because Israel has sole use of these flows, this means that Jordan 
maintains its commitment from the 1994 Water Annex to supply Israel a net 25 Mm3/y. Reading Figures 
6 and 11 together reveals that Israel benefits proportionately more than Jordan does from increased 
storage in the Wehdeh Dam, both in dry years and in heavy flood years. In other words, by virtue of the 
1994 Israel-Jordan treaty, the Israeli share is secured first even when the dam lies empty and the river 
runs at low flow. Due to the design of the Adassiyeh Weir, the Israeli share is increased in heavy flood 
years. As noted earlier, the Jordanian share is in effect 'bounded'; it is relatively low when the dam 
releases are low and relatively high when the flows are strong (as they have been since 2012). 
THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE IMPEDES TRANSFORMATION 
Considering the Adassiyeh Weir and Wehdeh Dam together, the short answer to the main question of 
this article is that the design and operation of the international infrastructure maintain the Yarmouk 
water arrangements in the state that they were when the infrastructure was built. This section seeks to 
explain that stability by considering the extent to which the design and operation reflects the technocratic 
processes of development and diplomacy,  reinforces power asymmetries, and impedes the resolution 
of contentious issues. 
Design and operation of the infrastructure reflecting and re-enforcing asymmetries in power 
The influence of power asymmetry may be gauged crudely through a rapid assessment of the relative 
benefits that the infrastructure has had for each of the states involved. Though the task has not been 
completed fully for Syria, the operation of the Wehdeh Dam appears currently to be of very little 
significance to the water authorities in the north part of the basin. The main purpose of the 1987 Jordan-
Syria water agreement was to build the dam, but it placed no restrictions on groundwater development 
and use inside Syrian territory (see Zeitoun et al., 2019a). Though Syrian members of the hydrocracy have 
explained in detail how the dams they have built do not violate the terms of the agreement (Enas and 
Shallalah, 2018), no such claims have been made in relation to the Wehdeh Dam. Informal discussions 
with water resource managers and the monitoring of Syrian and Jordanian media have demonstrated 
that the construction of the Wehdeh Dam and the Adassiyeh Weir have not significantly influenced the 
transboundary water policy of the Syrian hydrocracy. Further investigation into the effect on shared 
water management of the absence of a hydropower component of the Wehdeh Dam (of which 75% of 
the power was to be distributed to Syria) would yield interesting insights in this direction. 
The infrastructure appears somewhat more relevant to the water bureaucracy in Israel. Muller et. al. 
(2016) point out the association between assumed reduced groundwater pumping in Syria and the post-
2012 filling of the Wehdeh Dam; they suggest that in that sense Jordan has benefitted indirectly from the 
outbreak of war in Syria in 2011. The more surprising finding of this paperʼs tracking of the flows through 
the infrastructure is that the Israeli farmers and Israeli government have – at least in 2012 and 2013 – 
also benefitted from the filling of the dam, and largely 'immune' to the amount of water the dam has 
stored or released since that time. Figure 6 shows how an average of 69 Mm3/y (48 Mm3/y if flood years 
are excluded) has bypassed or spilled over the weir since its construction in 1999. As all of the bypass and 
overspill flows are captured and used by Israel (see Zeitoun et al., 2019a), the Israeli Yarmouk triangle 
farmers have secured on average more than the 40 Mm3/y share of Yarmouk flows that they had sought 
since the 1950s, and the Israeli state has secured more than the 25 Mm3/y that it is due according to the 
terms of the 1994 peace treaty. Moreover, this minimal Israeli share fixed by the terms of the treaty is 
secured even if the dam reservoir levels drop and the flows in the river decrease. The assurance has been 
accomplished through different methods over the decades: by the Yarmouk triangle farmersʼ 
manipulation of the rock weirs, by the governmentʼs international treaty, and through the design and 
operation of the Adassiyeh Weir. 
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The extent to which the international infrastructure favours Jordan is less clear. The dam had been 
proposed as beneficial to Jordanians originally in the Franjieh Plan over a century ago and was again 
called for in two agreements that Jordan signed with Syria. The flows that make it into the dam are highly 
responsive to upstream water use (primarily in Syria, but also in Jordan) and precipitation rates (as 
determined within the limits of the inadequate data that is available). Though future flows into the dam 
reservoir are anticipated to drop if groundwater withdrawals in the Hauran Plain resume, the reservoir 
continues to fill (Figure 11). The Wehdeh Dam thus continues to meet at least one of its primary purposes, 
the regulation of the flow downstream for more steady inflow into the King Abdullah Canal via the 
Adassiyeh Weir. However, the design of the Adassiyeh Weir means that the assertion holds only when 
the flows are neither too low nor too strong. Considering that the dam was completed seven years after 
the weir and decades after pumping patterns in Syria had been established, the dam appears decidedly 
overdesigned. Even though the capacity of its reservoir was scaled down from 500 to 110 Mm3, a dam 
with half of this volume would appear to be better suited for its designated purpose. The opposite may 
hold for the Adassiyeh Weir, which appears undersized without the originally planned reservoir at al 
Himmeh/Hamat Gader, particularly given the generally acknowledged greater need for water in Jordan 
than in Syria or Israel. 
In summary, the Wehdeh Dam is crucial to Jordanʼs water supply and a key asset of its hydrocracy, 
but is largely irrelevant in Syria. The design and operation of the Adassiyeh Weir meanwhile suggests that 
it is as much an uncertain source of water for Jordan as it is a secure one for Israel. Considered alongside 
the Yarmoukim Reservoir discussed in Zeitoun et al., 2019a the dam and the weir can be read as 
components of a suite of discriminating international infrastructure. Israelʼs share is fixed in absolute 
terms by the treaty, while the hydrologic variability imposed by the climate and upstream pumping is 
passed on to Jordan. From a Jordanian perspective, the situation is akin to the two decades of water 
'cooperation' on the terms of its more powerful neighbours (see, for example, Thomas, 2017). Here, the 
less-powerful actor will have to confront clear and considerable obstacles in any attempt to effect any 
change in the current transboundary water arrangement. 
An alternative arrangement can be derived by questioning the effect that heightening the crest of the 
weir would have. Raising the crest would result in more flood flows being diverted to the KAC, which 
could readily double the Yarmouk flows used by Jordan (and still be well within the turbidity-limiting flow 
limit imposed by the Water Authority of Jordan). In the extreme, this would mean the diversion of all the 
Yarmouk flows at Adassiyeh into the King Abdullah Canal (though this would of course be subject to 
negotiation with Israel). The modified infrastructure would obviate the need for the 'water exchange' 
infrastructure and for the energy required to pump water to the Lake of Tiberias and back again. The 
modified infrastructure would also update the outdated (1950s) idea in a way that would meet current 
and future Jordanian water demand in the Jordan River Valley, and beyond. The volume and salinity-
reducing role of Yarmouk flows that benefit Israel and the Lake of Tiberias would be made up through 
the excess supply in the national system (plans for which are already in place (Wine, 2019)). 
Reflection on the enduring effect of the forgotten infrastructure 
Neither of these transboundary water arrangements have attracted much public debate or international 
diplomacy for some time and the alternative vision required for transformation is not expected to emerge 
under the current political context. Though they were planned out-of-sync, the dam and the weir both 
work together not only to impede but to stifle any transformation of the transboundary water 
arrangement between Jordan and Syria, and between Jordan and Israel. 
The assertion can be substantiated in part by the interplay between the infrastructure and the 
agreements that enabled them. The 1987 and 1994 water agreements may be considered the 
institutional foundation upon which infrastructure was built. It is striking to consider how the diplomacy 
that led to the agreements, which in turn led to the infrastructure, continues to shape the transboundary 
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water arrangements several decades on. Once they had been built, the weir and the dam committed the 
parties in a very concrete and lasting manner indeed; they continue to operate round the clock, through 
periods of extreme wet and dry, peace and war. They will likely continue to do so for the rest of their 
design lives, unquestioned as they are by the public or international diplomatic community. 
There is no reason to believe that the concrete must outlive the technocratic 'development' and 
diplomatic paradigms under which it was poured. Reducing the flow through the gates of the Adassiyeh 
Weir is a matter of turning the valves; reducing the overspill of the weir requires raising its crest or 
rebuilding the weir, neither of which is technically difficult. Likewise, while the Wehdeh Dam may have 
the capacity to store more water than it currently does, storage and release levels can be managed as if 
it were a dam half its size simply by opening or closing the gates. Thus, in the sense that the infrastructure 
can be modified or operated according to a different regime, it is no less reversible than is the text of the 
agreement. Both are static, in direct contrast to the ever-changing use and availability of the water. 
Changing the text, or the design or operation of the infrastructure obliges the consent of all the actors, 
however, and this appears to be yet another factor that shapes the static status quo. 
Beyond concluding generically that 'the political context' is all-determining, the findings suggest a 
selective depoliticising effect that may be altogether more enduring. Given the asymmetry in benefits 
and costs, the concrete structures on the mainstream of the Yarmouk can be seen in very many ways as 
expressions of the power of some people over others (to return to the observation of C. S. Lewis). Though 
the authors have not carried out specific investigation into the contentious narratives put forward by the 
hydrocracy, press and public online presence in Jordan about dams in Syria, use of the narratives appear 
to have peaked around 2011, or soon after the reservoir of the Wehdeh Dam started filling. Should 
renewed groundwater use in Syria or the effects of climate change result in the reservoir lying empty 
again, the narratives are likely to resume, and the issue will be readily repoliticised, if not also quickly 
securitised. 
Similarly, the silence that followed the construction of the Adassiyeh Weir in 1999 contrasts 
dramatically with the attention given to hydropolitics in the overtly violent decades that led up to its 
construction. The difference may be explained by the fact that the weir and the 1994 treaty did succeed 
in managing many of the contentious water issues between Jordan and Israel. In this scenario, the 
infrastructure and agreements would have rendered the transboundary water arrangements more 
resilient. However, considering the asymmetric benefits resulting from the design and operation of the 
weir, as demonstrated here, and the asymmetry in water distribution throughout the broader Jordan 
River Basin (in Zeitoun et al., 2019a), the silence may just as well be suggesting that the role that the 
infrastructure plays is simply no longer questioned by the hydrocracies or by the general public. If this is 
the more accurate scenario, the hydrocraciesʼ technocratic process of planning, design and operation of 
the infrastructure matches the international diplomatic processes, stripping the politics out of the use 
and distribution of the water. The theory reviewed suggests that this could be the result of the consent 
given by the less-powerful state authorities. In the process, asymmetries in power are played down and 
there is no consideration of alternative designs (such as a heightened weir) or operating regimes (such 
as keeping the bypass gates closed for longer). The local impact of the arrangement – on Jordan’s share 
within the wider Jordan River Basin or local control over the Mukheibeh Wells – is ignored, and tensions 
are stifled, at least for a while. In either scenario, Wittfogel’s 'nature' has acquired a wholly utilitarian 
function, and the international infrastructure works with the agreements to perpetuate rather than 
transform the arrangement.  
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ANNEX. JORDANIAN AND ISRAELI FLOW DATA IN AND AROUND THE ADASSIYEH WEIR 
Table A1. Distribution of Yarmouk flows at Adassiyeh.  
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1962 77.50 nd nd nd nd Nd 
1963 93.44 nd nd 93.44 nd Nd 
1964 109.08 nd nd 109.08 nd nd 
1965 138.94 nd nd 138.94 nd nd 
1966 133.93 nd nd 133.93 nd nd 
1967 136.15 nd nd 136.15 nd nd 
1968 150.54 nd nd 150.54 nd nd 
1969 97.73 nd nd 97.73 nd nd 
1970 63.22 nd nd 63.22 nd nd 
1971 115.86 nd nd 115.86 nd nd 
1972 149.64 nd nd 149.64 nd nd 
1973 112.01 nd nd 112.01 nd nd 
1974 124.57 nd nd 124.57 nd nd 
1975 125.60 nd nd 125.60 nd nd 
1976 126.10 nd nd 126.10 nd nd 
1977 126.78 nd nd 126.78 nd nd 
1978 128.64 nd nd 128.64 nd nd 
1979 113.75 nd nd 113.75 nd nd 
1980 124.23 nd nd 124.23 nd nd 
1981 128.26 nd nd 128.26 nd nd 
1982 144.02 nd nd 144.02 nd nd 
1983 128.56 nd nd 128.56 nd nd 
1984 145.12 nd nd 145.12 nd nd 
1985 126.39 nd nd 126.39 nd nd 
1986 125.92 nd nd 125.92 109.4 nd 
1987 167.90 nd nd 167.90 179.9 nd 
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1988 144.35 nd nd 144.35 184.7 nd 
1989 108.12 22.1 nd 108.12 50.8 nd 
1990 98.4 23.6 nd 98.4 58.2 nd 
1991 95.5 16.9 nd 95.5 66.4 nd 
1992 164.9 9.2 nd 164.9 613.3 nd 
1993 118.5 16.2 nd 118.5 146.9 nd 
1994 99.2 20.6 nd 99.2 67.7 nd 
1995 108.0 16.6 nd 124.6 68.7 nd 
1996 100.8 20.6 nd 121.4 55.6 nd 
1997 99.7 15.0 nd 114.7 57.0 nd 
1998 87.3 15.0 nd 102.3 62.9 nd 
1999 62.9 16.3 nd 79.2 28.1 nd 
2000 54.6 17.9 nd 72.5 51.3 nd 
2001 30.4 19.9 nd 50.3 38.4 nd 
2002 23.0 30.1 nd 53.1 58.6 nd 
2003 54.7 24.4 nd 79.1 465.4 418.5 
2004 68.6 28.8 nd 97.4 172.8 136.2 
2005 42.6 32.1 nd 74.7 59.1 18.1 
2006 14.25 34.8 nd 49.1 45.1 2.3 
2007 15.99 31.8 nd 47.8 35.1 1.6 
2008 14.90 30.2 6.9 52.0 30.8 2.5 
2009 10.59 29.1 15.3 55.0 40.6 6.6 
2010 12.67 27.7 11.5 51.9 33.0 0.2 
2011 13.65 25.8 10.1 49.6 32.7 0.6 
2012 18.52 27.9 16.8 63.2 51.6 10.2 
2013 28.32 25.9 34.3 88.5 76.9 31.7 
2014 16.04 23.8 38.7 78.5 33.9 0.0 
2015 19.00 23.3 48.9 91.2 32.5 0.1 
2016 7.52 23.3 70.4 115.3 34.4 0.2 
2017 3.9 23.2 79.3 120.8 28.8 0 




87 23 40 105 
94 / 65  






26 n/a n/a 
1986-1999: 
121 / 118  
(if 1992 removed) 
1999-2018: 
72 / 71.5  
(if 2003 removed) 
1986-1999: 
125 / 87  
(if 1992 removed) 
1999-2018: 
69 / 48  
(if 2003 removed) 
n/a 
Sources: JVA and JVWA, and as noted. 
Notes: As discussed in the text, discrepancies are due to measurement error and poor reliability of the reported data; nd = no 
data; AW = Adassiyeh Weir; WD = Wehdeh Dam. 
* Main databases used are listed. All are checked against JVA (2006), JVA (2016b), JVA (2018), and JVA (2019), with minor 
irregularities due to different labels and periods; 
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 ^ Column e calculated as follows: from 1962 to 1995 equal to Column b; from 1995 to 2006 sum of Columns b and c; from 2006 
to 2018: sum of Columns b, c, and d. 
^^ Column f includes 'uncontrolled water' (from Column g) from 2003 onwards. 
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